Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses

CMC Student Scholarship

2014

Pieces of a Mosaic: Revised Identities of the
Almoravid Dynasty and Almohad Caliphate and alBayan al-mugrib
Rolando J. Gutierrez
Claremont McKenna College

Recommended Citation
Gutierrez, Rolando J., "Pieces of a Mosaic: Revised Identities of the Almoravid Dynasty and Almohad Caliphate and al-Bayan almugrib" (2014). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 844.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/844

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

1

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
PIECES OF A MOSAIC:
REVISED IDENTITIES OF THE ALMORAVID DYNASTY AND ALMOHAD
CALIPHATE AND ALBAYAN ALMUGRIB

SUBMITTED TO
PROFESSOR HEATHER FERGUSON
AND
PROFESSOR KENNETH B. WOLF
AND
DEAN NICHOLAS WARNER
BY
ROLANDO J. GUTIERREZ

FOR
SENIOR THESIS
SPRING 2014
APRIL 28, 2014

2

3

Abstract
This study seeks to clarify the identities of the Almoravid and Almohad Berber
movements in the larger Crusade narrative. The two North African Islamic groups are often
carelessly placed within the group identified as “Islam” in discussions about the series of military
campaigns that took place not only in the traditional Holy Land but also throughout regions of
the Mediterranean such as Spain; this generalized identifier of “Islam” is placed against a much
more complex group of generally Christian parties, all of them seen as separate, unique groups
under the umbrella identifier of Christianity. This foray into a late 13th century North African
Arabic history of the two groups will attempt to build a more robust identity for the two groups.
The way in which they were remembered by their immediate successors will reveal far more
interesting parties than simply zealous Muslims waging jihad. The two groups in question are the
Almoravids and the Almohads.The Almoravid (alMurabitun;  ) ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﺑﻄﻮﻥdynasty, an invading
force of recently converted Berber tribes from the Maghrib, made their primary foray into the
Iberian Peninsula in 1085; this provoked the beginning of the Reconquista in earnest and the
true entrance of the crusade/jihad mentality in the region. The Almoravids were eventually
succeeded by the Almohad (alMuwahhidun;  ) ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺣﺪﻭﻥCaliphate in 1147; this next generation
of recently converted Berber tribesman would become the primary rival in the tale of the
Reconquista up until their defeat at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Their presence
in the region is primarily remembered by their military involvement with Christian forces in the
region, though the history of Muhammad ibn Idhari, written around 1295, reveals the groups
and their ideologies to be far more complicated than simply meets the eye.
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Memory of the Berber Dynasties
On 16 July, 1212, the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in what is today southern Spain
marked the turning point of the Spanish reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula .1 The combined
armies of the Christian kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Navarre, the Spanish Military Orders of
Santiago, Calatrava, the Temple, and the Hospital, and volunteers from southern France
completely routed the “Saracen” army under the “king of Morocco”, having inflicted heavy
casualties while their own losses were fairly light.2 Within the next few decades, the peninsula
would be under Spanish rule save for the southern most regions, a far cry from what had been
the political norm for the Iberian Peninsula since the initial Islamic invasion in 711. While the
diverse Christian alliance at Las Navas is well documented and has been the focus of many
historians of the early Crusade period, the same cannot be said about their opponents on the
field. Who were these opponents of the Christian kings of northern Spain and their Christian
allies? To many, these warriors and their caliph were simply Berbers from the Atlas Mountains
who had stumbled their way onto the stage of history, contending in pitched battle with their
ideological rivals in perhaps one of the only conflicts during the Crusades that came close to

1

2

Within this work, the terms “alAndalus”, “Iberian Peninsula ”, and “Iberia” will be used in reference to the
western European landmass that is today called Spain and Portugal. AlAndalus will be used specifically for
the identification of the southern half of the peninsula while under Islamicate rule. “Spain” will only be used
when prefaced with reference to the modern political entity that arose after 1492 in an effort to create
meaningful geographic comparisons.
Joseph F. O'Callaghan, Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 7074. O'Callaghan utilizes primary sources from the aftermath of the battle such
as correspondence between King Alfonso VIII and Pope Innocent III to relay the disparity of the casualties.
Alfonso VIII reports that some “100,000 armed men or more fell … according to the Saracens whom we
captured” on the caliph's side while the Christian coalition lost “hardly twentyfive or thirty” men. These
numbers are most likely exaggerated but do well to showcase the impact of the battle.
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realizing a cosmic battle between two great faiths. More specifically, they were the Berber
Almohad dynasty, a dynasty that had taken control of the majority of the Maghreb and half of
Iberia. They and their predecessors, the Almoravid dynasty, have been consistently brushed
aside in history in favor of scholarship focusing “exclusively on either the 'Abassids in the east,
or Córdoba and the Umayyads in Andalusia”; in English, these dynasties have been “almost
completely overlooked”.3 Until recently, most scholarship focusing on the reconquest and
crusades in the Iberian Peninsula only gave the dynasties a cursory glance at best; recent work
on the subject has helped to make up for the centuries of neglect, though quality scholarship is
still desperately needed in a topic that has been fairly unexplored.
With this in mind, the goal of this work is simple: to offer a more nuanced identity for the
Almoravid and Almohad Berber dynasties based on the medieval history of the North African
Islamic historian Muhammad ibn Idhari, who will be discussed in length with his history in the
next section. The identities I propose are not meant to be all encompassing and are by no means
identities that should be used to describe the two Berber movements as a whole. Instead, I
intend to use the identities drawn from ibn Idhari's text to create a more robust memory of the
Almoravids and Almohads, a memory that sees them as Islamic phenomena unique to North
Africa and the time period, both inherently similar and yet vastly different from each other .
These identities will be exclusively founded on the political natures of the groups and the
two groups’ approaches to the ideology of jihad and holy war. While this is admittedly narrow,
I believe that these are the two most overlooked or oversimplified aspects of the two groups’

3

Allen J. Fromherz, The Almohads: The Rise of an Islamic Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 5.

7

current identities. The political aspects of the Almoravid and Almohad movements are all but
forgotten save for the few historians who specialize in the Berber Islamic movements. Thus, a
focus on the political aspects of the groups in any manner would provide ample material to craft
more complex identities. In a very different manner, the ideology concerning jihad of the two
groups is perhaps the most remembered though overgeneralized aspect of the pair. Using ibn
Idhari’s history, I intend to show a far more delicate and nuanced approach to religiously
inspired warfare.
By examining the political growth and the specific approach to holy war, I hope to shed
some light on these often forgotten characters in history. However, before this examination
begins, I feel it is necessary to discuss what little is known about the author, Muhammad ibn
Idhari.
Ibn Idhari and alBayan almugrib
It must be said that little is known of Abu Abbas Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Idhari
alMarrakushi, the North African author of the medieval history alBayan almughrib fi
akhbar alAndalus waalMaghrib, translated as “The Amazing Exposition on the History of
alAndalus and the Maghreb”.4 Ibn Idhari wrote during the first two decades of the fourteenth
century in Marrakesh, as can be observed by his nisba, under the Maranid Dynasty, which had
taken the place of the Almohad Caliphate.5 It is not unwise to assume that he may have been a
4

N. Levtzion and J. F. P. Hopkins, eds (1981), Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 216.
5

Levtzion, Corpus, 216; P. Bearman and Th. Bianquis, eds. “Nisba.” In Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. 2012.
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaofislam2/nisbaCOM_0866. The nisba “or
‘noun of relation’ is one of the components of the medieval Arabic proper name. Its function is to express
the relation of the individual to a group, a person, a place, a concept or a thing”, thus indicating an
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jurist due to his literacy and access to a number of historical documents. The text, which is more
commonly known by its shorter name alBayan almughrib (mugrib), is a three part history
concerning the Maghreb; the third portion of which deals exclusively with the history of the
Almoravid and Almohad dynasties. 6 This history, in its extent form, covers the time period
spanning from the foundation of the Almoravid movement circa 1040 to approximately 1172.
The text follows a simple structure of an anecdotal chronology detailing selected events
separated by identificatory headings. In this way, ibn Idhari manages to cover a number of
political and military events with a surprising amount of detail all while slowly progressing
through time from the beginnings of the Almoravids to, one can imagine, the end of the
Almohads and the rise of his own Maranid Dynasty. While the history of the text itself and its
discovery are worth writing about, such things are not the purpose of this section; I intend
instead to use this brief section to discuss the nature of working with someones voice from the
past.
Ibn Idhari wrote under the Maranid Dynasty; he most likely kept the political dynamics
in mind while composing the text. He, no doubt, had his own peculiarities of faith and
frameworks for the interpretation of history and religion. Despite the lack of information we
have on the author, his perspective on the history of the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties fits

association with the city of Marrakesh. Thus, a rough English interpretation of his name might be
Muhammad, son of Idhari, of Marrakesh.
6

From this point forward, the title of this work will be referred to as alBayan almugrib, which is the
Spanish transliteration; mughrib is the English transliteration of the Arabic title. While both are correct, I
shall be using the Spanish form of the word as it is the primary version of the text I used. This same rule is
applied throughout this paper when dealing with the Spanish transliteration of Arabic words and names. To
denote the Spanish forms of words and names, quotation marks will be placed around the aforementioned
selections.
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within the accepted framework of traditional North African histories; this means a particular
attention is paid to the history as it pertains to validating or legitimizing the current political
institution and its policies. This must be kept in the reader’s mind while examining the data mined
from the text. Every word spoken about the Almoravid and Almohad groups was chosen with
care; only when he explicitly states that he is quoting another source about a particular person,
place, or event can we view things from an alternate perspective; even then, one must be aware
that he chose that particular passage or source as opposed to another for a reason, intentionally
posturing himself and the two groups however he saw fit. I intend to utilize this individuality in his
writing to my advantage; by focusing on ibn Idhari’s choice of terminology and selection of
history, I will be able to tease out details that would not necessarily have been obvious in the
text as a whole. His words regarding the Almoravids and Almohads will reveal their identities
through a particular lens, providing me with a distinct and individual opinion of an individual far
less removed from the history than some others who have written about them, both medieval
and contemporary.
Almoravid Dynasty: Institutional Identity
The institutional identity of the Almoravids was shaped by their ability to establish a
dynastic regime out of a traditional tribal system, the ability to become a major trading power in
the Islamic world, and the ability to exert military power in such a way that extended their
presence far from their Marrakesh. Within ibn Idhari's history, one can find substantial evidence
supporting and identifying the stages of growth that the dynasty went through on its way out of
the Atlas Mountains and into the wider western Mediterranean. This evidence comes both in the
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form of the words written down in alBayan almugrib and in what can be extrapolated from
seemingly trivial pieces of information. Throughout the sections of the text that trace their
political rise, I will attempt to follow the chronology of events as closely as possible in an effort
to more accurately construct a political identity for the Almoravids. The benefit of following the
chronology is this: the natural flow of events as recorded by ibn Idhari build upon each other,
slowly crafting a more robust image of the dynasty as it progresses from a simple mission of
evangelism focused primarily on the tribal unit to a dynastic kingdom spanning North Africa and
alAndalus.
The Almoravid movement began with three personages of historical significance: 'Abd
Allah ibn Yasin (1040–1059), Yahya ibn Ibrahim (10401050), and Yahya ibn Umar
alLamtuni (c. 10501056). Though the extant copy of ibn Idhari's history does not include this,
it is well known through other historical chronologies of Islam in North Africa that Yahya b.
Ibrahim, a chief of the Gudala tribe, made a pilgrimage to Mecca and, on his return journey,
stopped at Qayrawan to seek out the Malikite teacher Abu Imran. Upon finding him, Abu
Imran was “moved by the Sanhaja chief's [ibn Ibrahim]sense of nobility, his honesty, and his
innocence, but he expressed shock at the Saharan's shallow understanding of the faith”; he thus
recommended that one of his students in the Maghreb aid ibn Ibrahim in correcting Islam in his
tribal lands.7 According to ibn Idhari, ibn Ibrahim proclaimed “oh señor nuestro! Mira a quien
envías conmigo a nuestro país para que nos enseñe nuestra religión ...”.8 He then left to Sus

7
8

Ronald A. Messier The Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 34.
Muhammad ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib. Nuevos fragmentos almoravides y almohades. Traducidos y
anotados trans. Ambrosio Huici Miranda. (Valencia: Anubar Ediciones, 1963), 12. ““Oh our Lord! Look at
who comes with me to our country to teach us our religion”.
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alAqsa and the dar alMurabitun, a religious school founded by one of Abu Imran's former
students.9 Here ibn Ibrahim met the man who would be the foundation of the Almoravid
movement's driving ideology: 'Abd Allah ibn Yasin. Ibn Yasin accompanied ibn Ibrahim back
to his home in the Atlas Mountains and began his earliest preaching missions. Preaching to the
Berbers of the Gudala tribe, he gathered seventy members of the tribe in order to “les enseñase
… en la jurisprudencia de su religion”.10 Ibn Yasin “imposed a strict enforcement of the laws of
Islam” as they were understood in the Malikite school of law; such laws included the exact
mimicry of the imam during prayers, the “obligation to strive for truth and the suppression of
injustice”, and a vehement opposition towards noncanonical taxes.11 This preaching mission
succeeded in giving ibn Yasin enough sway over the Gudala tribe in order to command them
“atacar a las cabilas de Lamtuna, a las que guerreó Gudala hasta que las vencieron y entraron
en la obediencia de 'Abd Allah b. Yasin y atacaron con ellas a las demás cabilas del desierto y
les hicieron la guerra”.12 Wielding the military power of several tribes, ibn Idhari describes the
situation of the Gudala tribe under the combined leadership of ibn Ibrahim and ibn Yasin as
such: “Se fortaleció el poder de Gudala con sus triunfos hasta que murió Yahya b. Ibrahim”.13

9

10
11
12

13

Messier, Almoravids, 4. Dar alMurabitun roughly translates to “the abode of those who are bound
together in the cause of God”, though there are varying interpretations of what murabitun exactly means in
this context.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 1213. “... to teach them … in the jurisprudence of his religion”.
Messier, Almoravids, 4, 8.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 13. “... to attack the tribes of the Lamtuna, with which the Gudala warred
until they defeated them and they entered the obedience of 'Abd Allah b. Yasin. They attacked with them
the other tribes of the desert and fought against them”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 13. “The power of the Gudala was strengthened with their victories until
Yahya b. Ibrahim died”.
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With the death of ibn Ibrahim, ibn Yasin quickly lost favor amongst the Gudala and was
driven out.14 Ibn Yasin found protection in the form of the Lamtuna tribe, recently conquered
and converted to the orthodox Islam of ibn Yasin's teachings, and their chief Yahya b. Umar b.
Bulankain alLamtuni. Under Yahya b. Umar, the Almoravid movement would begin its
expansion beyond the few tribes of the Atlas Mountains. Ibn Yasin continued his preaching
mission to the neighboring tribes under the same structure as before. The Lamtuna tribe under
the leadership of Yahya b. Umar provided a military base that could back up ibn Yasin's
message of unification under orthodoxy with force. This early confederation of tribes is
described by ibn Idhari as such: “Estas tres cabilas eran entonces musulmanes, que se
levantaron para proclamar el derecho, rechazar la injusticia y suprimir los impuestos ilegales;
seguían la sunna – la tradición ortodoxa ... preferían la muerte a la derrota y no respetaban al
que huía del combate.”15 This zeal to uphold la tradición ortodoxa and their ability to fight
“sobre camellos más que a caballo y la mayoría marchaba a pie en filas, una tras otra” made the
refusal to submit to ibn Yasin and the Lamtuna tribe a dangerous and often times fatal affair.16
This description of the battle formation that the Almoravids would assume is also an indication
of the groups development from tribal raiding parties into a more formalized fighting force,
something that gave them a distinct advantage over their enemies. Some attribute this change of
tactics to ibn Yasin's preaching mission as well since it was in the Qur'an that “the prophet

14
15

16

Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 14.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 19. “These three tribes were then Muslims who rose up to proclaim the
right, reject injustice, and remove illegal taxes; they followed the sunna – the orthodox tradition … they
preferred death to defeat and they did not respect those that fled from combat”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 19. “... on [the backs of] camels more than horses and the majority [of the
fighters] marching on foot in files, one after another”.
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Muhammad fought that way, and so did his first four successors”; modeling themselves on these
“lofty series of precedents” is something that the Almoravids, the Almohads, and even their
successors would strive for in order to create religious legitimacy for their rule.17 The particular
Qur'anic passage referred to here is from Sura asSaff and reads:

. ﺍﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻳﺤﺐ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﻘﺎﺗﻠﻮﻥ ﻓﻲ ﺳﺒﻴﺎﻩ ﺻﻔﺎ ﻛﺎﻧﻬﻢ ﺑﻨﻴﺎﻥ ﻣﺮﺻﻮﺹ

18

The passage's reference to the tightly packed battle array was adopted literally by the
Almoravids; this quite nicely indicates how Islam seeped into the Berber way of life outside of
the context of prayer, fasting, taxation, and pilgrimage. Even in the earliest years of the
movement, the Almoravids were already shifting slowly from a tribal unit to a more organized
body with ibn Yasin's orthodox Islam acting as a facilitator.
Ibn Idhari provides an excellent example of how this early system worked in the
following passage: “Los [unas cabilas bereberes sin la religión de Islam] llamó Abd Allah b.
Yasin a la religión y se le resistieron, por cual mandó a Lamtuna atacarlos, como lo hicieron”.19
The new tribes were presented with a call to join ibn Yasin's movement peacefully by submitting
to his strict adherence to Islam, which ibn Idhari describes as entering “en el Islam y en la ley de
Muhammad y a que pagaran lo que Allah les había impuesto de la limosna legal – zakat”; if
they refused, as those in this passage did, ibn Yasin would rally the forces of the Lamtuna to
17

18

19

Messier, Almoravids, 13. The concept of the Almoravids and Almohads utilizing the precedents of militancy
to provide legitimacy to their ideological positions is fairly common in the dar alIslam. This point has been
most recently argued by Thomas Sizgorich; I will discuss the importance of this theory and its implications
for the identity of the Almoravids and Almohads in the following chapter.
Qur'an 61:4 “Truly Allah loves those who fight in His Cause in battle array, as if they were a solid cemented
structure”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 21. “Abd Allah b. Yasin called them [some Berber tribes without the religion
of Islam] to the religion and they resisted, for which he commanded the Lamtuna to attack them, which was
done”.
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forcefully subjugate them.20 Through this pattern of expansion, the early Almoravid movement
began to grow beyond its own borders; in order to solidify this newfound power, “ los llamó
Abd Allah b. Yasin Almoravides y llamó a su emir Yahya b. Umar emir del derecho”.21 The
name Almoravids comes from the Arabic alMurabitun,  ﺍﻟﻤﺮﺍﺑﻄﻮﻥ, a term that signifies the
groups adherence to the cause of God while also implying a connection to the frontier military
fort, the ribat, that dotted the frontier landscape of North Africa. The term given to Yahya b.
Umar, “emir del derecho”, in Arabic translating to amir alhaqq/ﺃﻣﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﺤﻖ, can be seen as a
term legitimizing the rule of a leader in an Islamic group. Haqq or hakk can be defined as
“established fact … and therefore truth”; it can also extend to imply “claim” or “right” in the
sense of a legal obligation, which can be distinguished as “Islamic religious law the ḥaḳḳ Allāh ,
mainly Allāh’s penal ordinances, and the ḥaḳḳ alādamī , the civil right or claim of a human”.22
Therefore, the title amir alhaqq implies a leader whose claim to the power of jurisprudence
acts as a legitimizing factor. The use of this term is no doubt connected to this; the term would
have firmly established ibn Umar's position as the legitimate leader within the context of a
political entity with a heavy emphasis on religion. The Almoravids, under the dual leadership of
ibn Umar and ibn Yasin, would no doubt have qualified as such.
Following the success of the early leaders, the institutional dynamic of Almoravid group
changed from a tribal confederation to a more centralized government. Reading ibn Idhari, one

20

21

22

Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 22. “... into Islam and the law of Muhammad and that they pay the legal alms
that Allah had imposed – zakat”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 21. “Abd Allah b. Yasin called them Almoravids and called his commander,
Yahya b. Umar, 'commander of truth'”.
“Hakk.” In Encyclopedia of Islam,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaofislam2/hakkSIM_2639.
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can locate several instances of this process of centralization and the consolidation of an
overarching power structure. One such instance is found in the successful creation of a dynasty,
a clear indication of a transition from a tribal structure that elected its leaders through consensus
to a localized hereditary power. Following the deaths of ibn Yasin in 1059 and ibn Umar in
1056, there was a successful and fairly peaceful transition of leadership to ibn Umar's son, Abu
Bakr ibn Umar (10561072). Though the transition from Abu Bakr to his cousin Yusuf ibn
Tasfin (10721106) was nothing less than an outright seizure of power on the part of Yusuf, the
ability to wield centralized power had and would continue to be in the family until the end of
Almoravid rule with the leadership of Ishaq ibn Ali in 1147. This power to rule was seen as
religiously ordained, as Abu Bakr, when he had failed to find a suitable lieutenant in his absence
on campaigns, was given a vision and “le inspiró Allah el recuerdo de Yusuf b. Tasfin hasta que
llegó del país del Magrib”. 23 Tasfin made one more step in the direction of solidifying power; as
ibn Idhari describes Yusuf's succession in the following way: “Cuando se agravó la enfermedad
del emir de los musulmanes Yusuf b. Tasfin, confió el poder a su hijo, el heredero del trono”.24
The term heredero is only overshadowed in this excerpt by the phrase “emir de los
musulmanes”; this phrase is an honorary title reserved only for those leaders in the dar
alIslam of higher standing, reputation, and authority specifically in an Almoravid context.25 Its

23

Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 43. “God inspired the memory of Yusuf b. Tasfin until he [Abu Bakr] arrived
in the Maghreb”.
24
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 113. “When the Commander of the Muslims Yusuf b. Tasfin's sickness was
aggravated, he confided power to his son, the heir to the throne”.
25
“Amir alMuslimin.” In Encyclopedia of Islam,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaofislam2/amiralmusliminSIM_0618. “Lord of
the Muslims, a title which the Almoravids first assumed, in contradistinction to Amīr alMuʾminīn [q.v.].
The latter title was borne by the independent dynasties; the Almoravids, however, recognized the
supremacy of the ʿAbbāsids and did not wish to arrogate to themselves this title of the Caliphs. So they
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importance as an alternative title to amir alMu’minin, indicating recognition as a caliph, will be
discussed in further detail shortly.
Under the rule of Abu Bakr b. Umar, another milestone of institutional growth was met.
Starting on May 7, 1070, Abu Bakr began construction on the city of Marrakesh, which would
become the capital of both the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties.26 This movement from a
tribal way of life towards a sedentary one is a major marker of the group’s overall institutional
identity. The construction of a capital, a permanent installation and symbol of governance, acted
as a means of securing political dominance that, when combined with a successful dynasty of
rulers, effectively moved the Almoravids out of the category of scattered raiding tribes in the
Atlas Mountains and into a larger arena of political influence in the Mediterranean. Following the
construction of a capital and the succession of Yusuf b. Tasfin, the group’s involvement in the
region increased immensely. The Almoravid capacity for war, too, dramatically grew; Ibn Idhari
describes an instance where an “ejército [envió] a la región de Sale” and “ese mismo año envió
también Yusuf b. Tasfin otro ejército al Garb”.27 The use of multiple armies meant that more
territory could be covered and conquered in a shorter amount of time while indicating a military
presence unparalleled in western North Africa at the time. Ibn Idhari also reports “ y este mismo

26
27

established a kind of subcaliphate with a title of their own. Afterwards the African and Spanish princes
bore either the one or the other of these titles, according as they sought after the independent caliphate or
recognized any supremacy”; “Dar alIslam.” In Encyclopedia of Islam,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaofislam2/daralislamSIM_1703. “ʿThe Land of
Islam’ or, more simply, in Muslim authors, dārunā , ‘our Country’ is the whole territory in which the law of
Islam prevails. Its unity resides in the community of the faith, the unity of the law, and the guarantees
assured to members of the umma”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 40.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 5556. “[He] sent an army to the region of Sale”. “That same year Yusuf b.
Tasfin also sent another army to the Garb”.
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año (1106) salieron setenta naves por el mar occidental, y se dirigieron a la Casa Santa –
Jerusalén”.28 Truly the Almoravids had reached a new level of martial prowess when they were
able to lend naval support to the developing situation in the Levant following the fall of Jerusalem
in 1099. Of course, none of the seventy ships made it to the Levant, as they all sank in the
Mediterranean; this is beside the point however, as it is the projection of power embodied in
this act that demonstrates the larger institutional transitions taking place. This ability to field
multiple armies throughout the year provided the Almoravids with the fighting power necessary
to eventually expand into alAndalus and match in terms of force the armies of the Christian and
taifa kingdoms.
The early territorial gains acquired through conquest included the important trade
centers of Awdaghust and Sijilmasa, which acted as the main point in which gold entered the
Sahara and the “principle port on the northern edge of the desert”, respectively. 29 This influx of
trade, especially gold, provided the monetary backing for the campaigns that the Almoravids
would continue to conduct on an almost annual basis for the next century. The development of
currency is another landmark on the path of Almoravid institutional growth; Ibn Idhari notes that
“este año [1072] hizo el emir Yusuf b. Tasfin la casa de la monedaen Marrakus, y acuñó en ella
la ceca de los dirhemes redondos”.30 These coins are described by ibn Idhari in the following
passage: “ su dinar de oro llevaba en una de sus caras: 'no hay más Dios que Allah, Muhammad
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enviado de Allah' y debajo de esto: 'el emir de los musulmanes Yusuf b. Tasfin', y en el círculo
'el que desea otro cosa que el Islam, como religión, no será recibida su tradición'  sunna , etc.
en la sura. En la otra cara el nombre del Amir alMu'minin al'abassi”.31 The description of this
coin is vital to understanding how the Almoravids positioned themselves as an Islamic power in
the Mediterranean. The first of the faces described immediately establishes its makers as
Muslims with the prominent placement of the shahada and the title amir alMuslimin referring
to Yusuf. The latter term firmly places Yusuf in the category of a rightful leader of an Islamic
community. The phrase found in the circle, a reminder of the prominence of faith above all other
things, identifies the makers not only as Muslims but as Muslims that espouse an ideology
steeped in traditional ideology, as the aforementioned phrases and titles indicate a conservative
stance on theology. The other side is perhaps the most telling of all and supports an argument
positing that the Almoravids attempted to craft themselves as orthodox Muslims, as it bears the
title and name of the Commander of the Faithful, the Abbasid Caliph.32 The juxtaposition of one
side of the coin to the other, of Commander of the Muslims to Commander of the Faithful, tells
us exactly where the Almoravids, at least Yusuf b. Tasfin, sought to place themselves in terms of
the Islamic powers on earth. Commander of Muslims indicates their sovereignty, their place as
an Islamic kingdom in the Maghreb. The recognition of the Abbasid Caliph on the reverse face
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 109110. “His dinar of gold had on one of its faces: 'There is no god but
Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of God' and under that 'the Commander of the Muslims, Yusuf b.
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of being a successor to the Prophet Muhammad.
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of the coin identifies the Almoravids as loyal Muslims who fall under the religious authority of the
Caliph in Baghdad; this not only removes them as a threat from the perspective of Baghdad but
also bolsters the Almoravid claim of religious orthodoxy and legitimacy and therefore their right
to correct those practicing the incorrect form of Islam.
This loyalty to the Abbasid Caliph can be explained by the caliphal presence in
alAndalus starting with Abd alRahman III in 316/928.33Proclaiming himself Caliph of the
Umayyad dynasty in opposition to the Abbasid usurpers, Abd alRahman introduced caliphal
politics into the peninsula, which remained a constant factor in the peninsula until eventual civil
war and disintegration into autonomous taifa, or party/faction, kingdoms. While the Almoravid
dynasty arose a half century after the disintegration of the Caliphate of Córdoba, Almoravid
leaders were no doubt aware of the constant competition between selfproclaimed caliphal
rights and deemed it best to join the Abbasid Caliphate. Thus, the absence of any Almoravid
claim to the title of Caliph and submission, at least nominally, to Baghdad can be explained by a
disinterest in challenging Abbasid political power while still maintaining a position of authority in
the region by creating a unique title, amir alMuslimin, to legitimize their rule.
Yusuf b. Tasfin led the Almoravids into the Iberian Peninsula following the fall of
Toledo in 1085 and the taifa kingdoms' plea for aid.34 Here, the Almoravids entered European,
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“Amir alMu’minin.” In Encyclopedia of Islam,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaofislam3/commanderofthefaithfulCOM_255
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From the fall of the Caliphate of Córdoba in 1031 to the capture of Toledo by Alfonso VI of Castile, the taifa
kingdoms had been primarily focused on intense competition with each other that alliances with the
northern Christian kingdoms were common practice. However, with the fall of Toledo and the rise of a
Christian power, some of the taifa kingdoms decided to take necessary precautions against conquest by
inviting the Almoravid armies into the Iberian Peninsula with the sole purpose of rallying against Alfonso.
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and more specifically Spanish, history with their legendary engagements with Rodrigo Díaz de
Vivar, The Cid. These battles over Valencia are remembered in song, poetry, and Spain's
Reconquista history and are the primary memory conjured up when the Almoravids are
mentioned. This moment of expansion across the sea is where one can see the full extent of the
Almoravid system of bureaucracy that had developed in an organic effort to support the new
kingdom. This is most evident in the multitude of letters sent from Yusuf's successor, Ali ibn
Yusuf (11061143), to his many appointed governors and military leaders spread out across the
Iberian Peninsula and the Maghreb. Ibn Idhari records Ali as giving “a su hermano AbulTahir
Tamim al gobierno de Granada, y a Abu Abd Allah Muhammad b. Abi Bakr alLamtuni el de
Córdoba”.35 This and many other recorded examples of personal appointments to the multitude
of positions within each city captured demonstrates the extensive network of government that
had developed.
Of course, the governance of alAndalus was very different from that of the Maghreb.
In the latter, the Almoravids had experienced unparalleled power in their ability to conquer and
subjugate other tribes that did not conform to their particular interpretation of orthodox Islam;
this included the populations of Jews and Christians that had made the Maghreb their home over
the centuries. However, the medieval Iberian Peninsula, with its truly unique character of what
some may call convivencia in regards to the social dynamics, proved to be an entirely different
environment altogether. Ibn Idhari records some instances of the new struggles the Almoravids
faced when ruling over substantial nonMuslim populations: “Cuando llegó a la capital del emir
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Abu Abd Allah Muhammad b. Abi Bakr alLamtuni the governorship of Córdoba”.
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de los musulmanes Ali b. Yusuf, fue denunciado por los mozárabes de Granada … hasta que
los compensó de sus injusticias”.36 This new wave of nonMuslims must have had a major
impact on the Almoravids. In order to maintain some form of control over the territories in
alAndalus, the Almoravids themselves had to fundamentally change by allowing for the
existence of nonMuslims in the community. Such a compromise could prove beneficial for the
Almoravids. One such benefit can be seen in the extensive use of Christian mercenaries in
Almoravid armies near the end of their rule, such as for one of the campaigns against the rising
power of the Almohads, which ibn Idhari describes as: “El año 535 (114041) salió el ejército
de los Lamtuníes de Marrakus con mercenarios y cristianos y se encontró con los Almohades
en la montaña de Gadmiwa; lucharon ambas partes y triunfaron los Almohades sobre los
Lamtuníes, que se volvieron a Marrakus perdidos y con el maldito caíd de los cristianos
herido”.37 Of course, this compromise on values within the institution could no doubt be turned
against the Almoravid institution by their enemies.
Thus, from tribal beginnings and itinerant preaching to a kingdom spanning the Maghreb
and parts of modern Spain, the Almoravids were far from the simple enemies of Christians that
European memory takes them to be. They were a dynastic kingdom that ran in part on their
ferocity when waging war and their intelligence when establishing a centralized dynasty and
administrative bureaucracy. Their ability to wage war effectively allowed them to crush any
36
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opposition from rival tribes early on and to compete with the wealthy established powers to the
north. A fairly simple though effective administrative system allowed the Almoravids to manage
this growing territory; when the diversity of the people who lived in these territories arose as an
issue, the dynasty was adaptable and even benefited from the inclusion of other confessional
groups within its ranks. This religious zeal and intelligence in administration allowed the
Almoravids to find a comfortable position in the Mediterranean world of the eleventh and
twelfth centuries; even when remembered by the successors of their kingdom and successors of
the Almohads, Maranids like ibn Idhari described them not as some blot in Islamic history but
as a serious and dangerous political entity that commanded the deserts of North Africa and
struck fear into the hearts of the Christians in the Iberian Peninsula .
Almoravid Ideological Identity
The Almoravids, despite the clear political identity and complexity discussed in the
previous section, have been remembered throughout history for primarily one thing: being called
“to what the prophet Muhammad described as the lesser jihad (holy war) against those tribes
who refused to follow the religion of Islam”.38 The aura of jihad that has shrouded Almoravid
history has grown into the singular notion of their existence. Many historians are prone to equate
their campaigns against the tribes of the Sahara and the kingdoms of alAndalus to the Crusades
undertaken in the eleventh through thirteenth centuries along the eastern Mediterranean coast.
This is not only a serious misunderstanding and overgeneralization of the Almoravids as a
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political entity but also of the concept of jihad itself. Therefore, any discussion of the ideological
identity of the Almoravids must be prefaced by a definition of the term jihad and reflection on
what context constitutes an appropriate use of the term.
Jihad as an Arabic word “has no relation to holy war or even war in general”; the word
itself comes from the word root  ﺟﻬﺪ, meaning an effort or labor undertaken by an individual; in a
religious context, this takes on an ascetic meaning.39Thus, jihad can assume a multitude of forms
that have nothing to do with warfare40. Firestone delves into this distinction, explaining the
difference between a “jihad of the heart”, which “denotes struggle against one's own sinful
inclinations”, and jihads “of the tongue”, requiring “speaking on behalf of good and forbidding
evil”.41 There is, obviously, the form of jihad that defines the term throughout most of history
and which is the focus of puritan groups like the Almoravids and Almohads. This form of jihad,
usually qualified with “the phrase 'in the path of God' (fi sabil Allah)”, denotes a form of
“activity … furthering or promoting God's kingdom on earth”; while this can be achieved
through the aforementioned nonviolent methods, the issues of “defending Islam and propagating
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Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 16.
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ihād is the one form of war which is permissible in Islam, for, in
theory, Islam must constitute a single community organized under a single authority and any armed conflict
between Muslims is prohibited. Following, however, the disintegration of Muslim unity and the appearance,
beginning in the middle of the 2nd/8th century, of an ever increasing number of independent States, the
question arose as to how the wars which sprang up between them were to be classified. They were never
included within the strict notion of d̲
j̲
ihād—even in the case of wars between states of different religious
persuasion—at least according to the general Sunnī doctrine; and it is only by an abuse of language that
this term is sometimes applied to them, while those authors who seek for a precise terminology label them
only as ḳitāl or muḳātala (conflict, war). There is even hesitation in referring to the struggle against the
renegade groups in Islam as d̲
j̲
ihād”. Firestone’s definition of jihad compliments this as it attempts to create
a purely Qur’anic base for the word as it pertains to warfare.
Firestone, Jihad, 17.
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the faith”, sometimes referred to as jihad of the sword (jihad alsayf), are understood as
conducting “war on the behalf of Islam”.42
The waging of holy war, therefore, is seen as an extension of religious asceticism. This
idea itself is well explored by Muslim historians and theologians such as 'Abd Allah b.
alMubarak (d.797), who is known for his Kitab aljihad (Book of jihad) in which he
discusses the monastic nature of jihad. AlMubarak states that “Every community has its
monasticism, the monasticism of my community is jihad for the sake of God”; perhaps even
more explicit, he states that, “Roving monasticism was mentioned in front of the Prophet: The
Prophet said: 'God gave us in its stead jihad on His path and the takbir [the act of shouting
“God is greatest”] on every hill”.43 This almost natural association of holy war with ascetic and
pious activities continued to grow with the crosspollination of ascetic stories from the Christian
and Muslim religions. Sizgorich sees the Christian ascetic, the monk, as “an emblem of militancy
and ascetic piety joined in the person of communal vanguard”, emerge in the Muslim tradition in
the form of the mujahidun, these “horsemen by day and monks by night”.44 With these new
found spiritual models, one can easily see how a devout, recently converted Berber Muslim
would be “gazing longingly from a frontier ribat ... at the dar alharb or 'abode of war' and its
promise of martyrdom” and would see his work as “an embodiment of a pure and primordial
strain of Islam”.45 However, Firestone’s jihad is not without its flaws. The primary issue with his
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argument is that is almost entirely theoretical in the sense that it relies completely on Qur’anic
passages and the first decade or so following Muhammad’s death to create a baseline definition
that does not account for any historical change outside of the context of the early Islamic
conquest. Ibn Idhari’s history comes at a time where there is no longer single Islamic
community. Instead, there are a number of competing factions all across the Mediterranean and
the Near East, each of them interacting with each other and with nonMuslim political actors.
Thus, the context in which a holy war can be declared, such as when the community is
threatened, becomes ambiguous and gray. Still, even with its flaws and inability to be completely
flexible in the context of the twelfth and thirteenth century Maghreb, Firestone’s definition will be
the basis for my analysis of jihad, holy war, and religiously inspired violence throughout ibn
Idhari’s text. With this etymological history in mind, we can now analyze the language with
which ibn Idhari describes the conquests and missions of the Almoravids.
The earliest instances in which we see the Almoravids participating in actions that help
define their ideology are in fact the same instances in which we see their early political and
institutional identities develop. The early days of raiding against other tribes in the Atlas
Mountains did more than simply consolidate power under the Lamtuna tribe; the process of
evangelizing, or at least attempting to, and then retaliating violently when demands for
conversion or religious reformation by the other tribes were met with hostility established the
Almoravids as a movement obsessed with enforcing a very strict interpretation of Islam. Ibn
Idhari refers constantly, though rarely in any detail, to these “lucha[s] contra estos politeístas”
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during the early days of the movement.46 It is in these early raids against the socalled
“polytheists” that distinguish the Almoravids so much from their successors the Almohads; in
Arabic, ibn Idhari uses the phrase:
47

.""ﺣﺮﺏ ﻫﺆﻻء ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺮﻛﻴﻦ

The use of the word “ "ﺣﺮﺏas opposed to “ " ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺩis, to say the least, not what one would
expect when describing highly orthodox Muslim tribes waging wars for the sake of religion on
the brink of the Crusade era. Yet, there the word is in all of its secular glory, devoid of any
obvious religious connotations. As seen in the aforementioned example, Miranda translates the
word as lucha, which is a term not often associated with a specifically religious conflict; instead,
it is an altogether general term indicating only some sort of conflict. Messier has also noted this
lack of the term jihad in other portions of ibn Idhari's account of the Almoravids, stating that
“the word he uses here is ghazat, not jihad”. 48 Along with these two words, ibn Idhari uses the
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form three Arabic verb “"ﻗﺎﺗﻞ, which means to combat or engage in warfare with another; once
more, this word is devoid of any religious connotations.49 This indicates that, according to ibn
Idhari, these particular acts of warfare against the tribes surrounding the Lamtuna did not
constitute jihad. This is something unique to ibn Idhari's view of the early Almoravid movement;
later rulers of the Almoravids will be described as having conducted holy war, as will the
Almohads, but for some reason the earliest Almoravid conflicts were simply out of the realm of
jihad according to the terminology used. 50
Why does ibn Idhari avoid use of the term jihad in the early history? Utilizing Firestone
as a guide, one can reasonably assume that ibn Yasin's zeal to wage war on behalf of Islam and
to purify the religion of the surrounding tribes falls neatly within the definition of jihad as laid out
by particular verses in the Qur'an. This insistence on proclaiming the just, following the sunna,
and getting rid of illegal taxes is rather telling, as this is a common theme in some of the more
prolific verses in the Qur'an regarding the waging of war against the enemies of Islam; the first
half of Sura 9:5 states:
51

"."ﻓﺎﺫﺍ ﺍﻧﺴﻠﺦ ﺍﻻﺷﻬﺮ ﺍﻟﺤﺮﻡ ﻓﺎﻗﺘﻠﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﻤﺸﺮﻛﻴﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ ﻭﺟﺪﺗﻤﻮﻫﻢ ﻭﺧﺬﻭﻫﻢ ﻭﺍﺣﺼﺮﻭﻫﻢ ﻭﺍﻗﻌﺪﻭﺍ ﻟﻬﻢ ﻛﻞ ﻣﺮﺻﺪ

Interestingly enough, the verse continues and elaborates on the conditions under which an
enemy could surrender and be spared:
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52

"."ﻓﺈﻥ ﺗﺎﺑﻮﺍ ﻭﺃﻗﺎﻣﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﺼﻼﺓ ﻭﺁﺗﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﺰﻛﺎﺓ ﻓﺨﻠﻮﺍ ﺳﺒﻴﻠﻬﻢ ﺇﻥ ﺍﷲ ﻏﻔﻮﺭ ﺭﺣﻴﻢ

Another verse within the same sura, 9:29 also states:
"ﻗﺎﺗﻠﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻻ ﻳﺆﻣﻨﻮﻥ ﺑﺎﷲ ﻭﻻ ﺑﺎﻟﻴﻮﻡ ﺍﻵﺧﺮ ﻭﻻ ﻳﺤﺮﻣﻮﻥ ﻣﺎ ﺣﺮﻡ ﺍﷲ ﻭﺭﺳﻮﻟﻪ ﻭﻻ ﻳﺪﻳﻨﻮﻥ ﺩﻳﻦ ﺍﻟﺤﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﺃﻭﺗﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﻜﺘﺎﺏ
53

."ﺣﺘﻰ ﻳﻌﻄﻮﺍ ﺍﻟﺠﺰﻳﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻳﺪ ﻭﻫﻢ ﺻﺎﻏﺮﻭﻥ

These verses indicate that, even within the earliest formation of an Arabian monotheistic
movement that would eventually coalesce into the traditions of Islam, there were criteria defining
who was and was not within the community of believers; those on the outside were subject to
attack until they found themselves as either fellow Muslims or as a taxpaying group under
Muslim rule.54 Thus, ibn Yasin and the early Almoravid movement saw themselves as modern
renditions of the early Islamic community, making those who did not follow their particular view
of Islam outsiders subject to attack. This is especially true when recalling how much emphasis
ibn Idhari asserts the Almoravids placed on paying only legal, Islamic taxes. All of the illegal
taxes that ibn Idhari claims the tribes outside of the Lamtuna were collecting were grounds for
labeling them as heretics who were not strictly following the tenets laid out in the Qur'an or
sunna. The raids against them were in fact on the behalf of Islam, reforming the local tribes and
bringing the faith back to what the Almoravids considered to be orthodoxy. Following this train
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of thought, the early raids conducted by the Almoravids surely must have been seen as jihad;
however, the term is nowhere to be found.
This still does not explain why ibn Idhari avoids the specific term. When dealing with the
Christian kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula and their Muslim allies, he does not hesitate to
utilize the word jihad or guerra santa.55 When dealing with the later group of the Almohads,
the term is used often. It is simply not used in the context of the early tribal raids of the
Almoravids nor in the earliest conflicts of Yusuf ibn Tasfin in both North Africa and his
subsequent campaigns into the heart of the alAndalus. One can only speculate as to why he
chose to label some conquests against particular groups as guerra santa and others simply as
campaigns or raids. Messier describes how the famed historian ibn Khaldun wrote about a
particular episode in which ibn Yasin receives a letter from Sijilmasa extolling him to convince
the Lamtuna tribe to wage holy war against their unjust rulers.56 With this, it is shown that it is
not unheard of amongst other records of the Almoravids that they waged holy war against their
enemies. This only strengthens the idea that ibn Idhari deliberately chose to use different
terminology when describing the early conquests against Berber peoples in North Africa. As
pointed out before, Muhammad b. Idhari was writing under the Marinid Dynasty, which was the
Berber dynasty that succeeded the Almohads. This dynasty was formed from Zenata tribes, one
of the peoples whom the Almoravids had conquered during their early expansion in the
Maghreb. This connection could help explain why, according to ibn Idhari or at least to the
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audience he was writing for, the Almoravid conquests of North Africa up until Ali ibn Yusuf's
reign were not considered holy, as they were waged against the ancestors of the current ruling
faction.
However, while this may be a plausible reason concerning the conquests of ibn Yasin, it
still does not provide much in the way of cause for excluding Yusuf b. Tasfin's campaigns
against the Christian kingdoms of northern Iberia, especially Valencia, from the realm of holy
war. Once more, it is evident that the terminology describing his actions as jihad exist within
other histories about the Almoravids; and once more, ibn Idhari seems to be the exception to
this trend.57 The sections concerning Yusuf b. Tasfin and his interactions with Valenica and
Rodrigo Díaz the Cid, the Kingdom of Castile and Alfonso VI, and the various taifa kingdoms
of alAndalus are strange in that, while lacking in direct references to the term guerra santa,
there is an ample amount of ideological positioning going on that certainly creates an
environment in which holy war on behalf of Islam could exist.
This ideological positioning is one method utilized by ibn Idhari to create a specific
identity for the Almoravids; by recording the deeds and misdeeds of other groups, especially
those who were enemies of the Almoravids, he could effectively create a context for a war or
campaign to be holy and on behalf of the faith without having to use the actual terminology. The
conflicts with Valencia and Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar are recorded with a particular focus on the
suffering of the Muslim population within the city itself. Ibn Idhari relays the following concerning
the defense of Valencia: “Cuando las tropas almoravides vinieron a sitiarle, el maldito [Rodrigo
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Díaz] decidió expulsar a las mujeres y los niños de los musulmanes indigentes y obligarles a ir al
campamento de los asediantes, deciéndoles: ‘reuníos con los de vuestra religión’”.58 This
ideological positioning places the Christian ruler of the city in the light of someone who is pitiless
towards what could literally be read as the most helpless social group within the city: poor and
needy Muslim women and children. This renders ibn Tasfin's siege of Valencia all the more
noble, as he is now fighting not for conquest but for Islam and its umma, whom have been cast
out by that accursed and damned Christian, Díaz. Ibn Idhari describes the recapture of the city
as an act of divine will: “... y sacó Allah a Valencia de manos del politeísmo y del poder de los
cristianos; la limpió y volvió a ella la luz del Islam y de la religión de Muhammad ...”.59 The
interventionist role of Allah in the capture of the city automatically frames the conflict in the lens
of religious warfare; the talk of purifying the city afterward, “cleansing her and returning her to
the light of Islam and the religion of Muhammad”, places the whole act of conquering the city
from Christian and “polytheist” forces as either a defensive act of Islam or as a propagation of
the faith. Other instances of this ideological positioning take place outside of the context of
particular sieges and instead focus on individuals. At one point, in an effort to paint the Christian
forces to the north as the ideological and moral enemies, ibn Idhari makes reference to a fairly
well known scandal of the time: “Se refiere que Alfonso cometió adulterio con su hermana
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 81. “When the Almoravid troops arrived [at Valencia] to siege it, the
accursed one [Rodrigo Díaz] decided to expel the women and children of the indigent Muslims and forced
them to go to the camp of the besiegers, saying: 'Reunite with those of your own religion'”.
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 102. “... and Allah took Valencia from the hands of the polytheists and the
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Urraca, uniendo el cristianismo al paganismo”.60 This is a statement that very firmly places Islam
and the Almoravids on the moral high ground. The acts committed by their Christian enemies
help ibn Idhari justify a series of campaigns that resemble jihad waged by the Almoravid ruler
Yusuf b. Tasfin. Thus, one can only assume that the lack of the term itself is simply
representative of the writer's own preference for alternative though similar terminology; Tasfin
conducted jihad in all aspects but its name.
Ibn Tasfin's successor, Ali b. Yusuf, is depicted by ibn Idhari as an even more pious
and holy warrior. While the motivation, circumstances, and even language used to depict ibn
Tasfin's campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula could be used to claim that they were acts of jihad,
the author never once calls them so; this is most certainly not the case with ibn Yusuf. Ali b.
Yusuf's first act of war following his consolidation of power in Africa is described in the
following terms: “El año 503 1109/10 partió el emir de los musulmanes Ali b. Yusuf de
Marrakus para la campaña de la guerra santa y conquistó la ciudad de Talavera”.61 This is the
first direct mention of the term guerra santa, or holy war, within the history of the Almoravid
dynasty. As opposed to the terms “ "ﺣﺮﺏor “"ﻗﺎﺗﻞ, there is no doubt as to what term ibn Idhari
uses in the Arabic text:
"ﻭ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻨﺔ ﺛﻼﺙ ﺧﻤﺴﻤﺎﺋﺔ ﺗﺤﺮﻙ ﺍﻣﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﻴﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺑﻦ ﻳﻮﺳﻒ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺮﺍﻛﺶ ﺍﻟﻰ ﺍﻻﻧﺪﻟﺲ ﺑﺮﺳﻢ ﺍﻟﻐﺰﻭ ﻭ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺩ ﻭ ﻓﺘﺢ
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."ﻣﺪﻳﻨﺔ ﻃﻠﺒﻴﺮﺓ
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 121. “It refers to Alfonso [VI], who committed adultery with his sister
Urraca, uniting Christianity and paganism”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 122. “In the year 503 – 1109/10 – Ali b/ Yusuf, Commander of the Muslims,
departed from Marrakesh on the campaign of holy war and conquered the city of Talavera”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almughrib fi akhbar, 52. “In the year 503 – 1109/10 – Ali b/ Yusuf, Commander of the
Muslims, departed from Marrakesh on the campaign and holy war and conquered the city of Talavera”.
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The word “ ” ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺩis present in an almost ideal context; everything about this statement suggests
jihad as holy war. What distinguishes this moment from the reconquest of Valencia is not clear,
as the capture of the city of Talavera is described as such: “Se purificó la mezquita y se devolvió
a la forma musulmana”.63 Once more, as in Valencia, we have ibn Idhari describing the
conquest as one of purifying the city and returning it to its Muslim form; all of these actions,
again, constitute a method of defending Islam and propagating the faith, justifying the act as
jihad.
These acts of purification through war were not solely centered on the Christians of
modernday Spain. At this point in time, there were several groups and movements in North
Africa that sought to challenge both the military and spiritual authority of the Almoravids. A brief
yet telling example of this comes in the form of alJadr, who was a mysterious, selfproclaimed
prophet that was neither affiliated with the Jews nor the Arab peoples in the line of prophets,
according to the brief note Miranda leaves in his translation.64 His story is brief: “un hombre
pretendiendo que era alJidr … y desde ella fue llevado a la capital, Marrakus, donde fue
muerto y crucificado”.65 His arrival at Marrakesh prompted his death and crucifixion, a
punishment historically used against heretics, nonbelievers, and pagans throughout ibn Idhari's
text. Such innovations against the faith that the Almoravids propagated would not be tolerated,
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 123. “He purified the mosque and returned it to the Muslim form; he
renewed the sacred, instated the prayers, and Allah erased the infidelity within her”.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 173.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 173. “A man pretending that he was alJidr (alJadr) … and from there he
went up to the capital, Marrakesh, where he was killed and crucified”.

34

just as illegal taxes and a refusal to follow the sunna had led to raids against fellow tribes at the
movement's beginning.
Near the end of the Almoravid rule, ibn Idhari presents one more fascinating insight into
the notion that the Almoravids and their followers believed that they were conducting guerra
santa, or at least a historian chronicling their campaigns believed they were conducting holy war
on God's behalf. The passage, which depicts Ali b. Yusuf's successor, his son Tasfin ibn Ali,
reviewing his troops, reads as such: 66
Le [los caudillos de los Almoravides] dijeron: “el reino es para nosotros; en cuanto a
dejarlo o defenderlo, no se excusará nadie de nosotros en encontrarse con el enemigo;
y si sufrimos el martirio, el poder será para quien Allah quiera, después de nosotros” …
luego llamó a los Arabes y le dijeron: “lanza al enemigo sobre nosotros, y no nos
mezcles con nadie, y Allah verá nuestra obra” … Luego llamó a Zanata y a los
mercenarios – hasam – y le dijeron: “no hay más respuesta que los hechos, y nuestra
condición es que te encargues de nuestros huérfanos”.67
The answers of the three groups reveal much, as the language is most definitely in line with holy
war rhetoric while also revealing a more practical reason to join and campaign with the
66
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Tasfin b. Ali b. Yusuf, the son of Ali b. Yusuf, assumed control of the Almoravid dynasty in 1143 after some
issues regarding a brother and rival to the throne, at least according to ibn Idhari. His rule ended in 1145
following an illfated attempt to flee a siege by the rising Almohad group. Following his death, the
Almoravid dynasty quickly crumbled under the control of two final, shortlived kings, officially being
replaced by the Almohad group in 1147.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 21617. “The leaders of the Almoravids said to him: 'The kingdom is for us;
in leaving or defending, there is no excuse for any of us in closing with the enemy; and if we suffer
martyrdom, the power to be who Allah wills, it is subsequently from us.' … later he [Tasfin b. Ali] called the
Arabs and they said to him, 'We launch ourselves into the enemy, we do not mix with anyone, and Allah will
see our work.' … later he called to the Zanata and to the mercenaries – the hasam – and they said to him,
'There is no other answer aside from the fact of the matter, and our condition is that you take care of our
orphans'”.
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Almoravids. The first group replies that there is no excuse amongst them to avoid closing with
the enemy and suffering a martyr's death by the will of Allah. The second group, the Arabs,
speak of their selfsacrifice in launching themselves into the enemy, an act of unmatched
bravery, and of their purity of company, all of which Allah will see. The third group, comprised
of the neighboring umbrella Berber tribe of the Zenata and of Christian mercenaries, is perhaps
the only one who may not share in the belief of jihad; instead, they fight for a very practical
purpose: in the event of their death, Tasfin and his Almoravid group will be the ones to take care
of their orphans.68 Thus, the majority of Tasfin's fighters appeared to have seen themselves as
conducting guerra santa and eligible to the benefits of honor and glory on earth and in the
afterlife, should Allah will their deaths as martyrs.
Thus, one can see that in the eyes of ibn Idhari the Almoravids were much more
nuanced than other historians portray them. Though this is his own limited opinion of them, it
helps to flesh out the varying interpretations of the Almoravids and their place within North
African history and notions of warfare. There is no doubt that they waged holy wars against
those they deemed to be enemies of their faith; however, ibn Idhari shows us that there was
some dissent about the memory of this great Berber dynasty. By indirectly questioning the
ideological nature of the group, he has allowed us to craft a much more careful identity for the
Almoravids, one that recognizes a more complicated ideological approach to jihad than other
historians, both past and present, give them credit for. The Almoravids were driven by religious
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The Christian mercenaries are not a novelty in the medieval Iberian Peninsula. There are many records
indicating that Christian infantes, hidalgos, and ricohombres found employment fighting for Muslims;
Rodrigo Díaz is perhaps the most well known of these noblemen acting as soldiersforhire. Ibn Idhari makes
explicit references to Christian mercenaries elsewhere throughout the text.
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zeal to uphold their form of orthodoxy. We can see now that this included jihad and war on the
behalf of Islam; however, ibn Idhari reveals to us the possibility that they were also driven by the
means to survive and thrive, just like any other political organization founded on a raiding
society. Raiding neighboring tribes may be backed by some religious motivation, but the act of
subjugating a rival through force by conducting these raids is a simple and effective way for a
single tribe to become dominant in the region. This mundane and fairly obvious motive for
waging war and conquering is, in my opinion, too often downplayed in favor of highlighting the
religious aspects of their conquests, which could have very easily been added and expanded
upon in the memory of the historians who wrote of them long after their fall.
Perhaps, in light of the absence of jihad rhetoric in ibn Idhari’s text, one might argue
that there is a fundamental issue with the framework used in modern readership when analyzing
Islamic conquest narratives; this issue can be summarized as a modern obsession with jihad and
holy war sparked by violent events in the past decade of American and western European
history and with an effort to contextualize such violent acts in a modern setting. This newfound
interest in the subject and language of Islamic holy war has caused modern scholarship to search
everywhere for it, attaching it to texts that would otherwise have been purely historical in nature
and perhaps even discarded as they serve no purpose except for those who are experts in the
area. Proof of this is evident in titles of books that may convey to an audience some
groundbreaking revelation on jihad even when the content of the work itself concerns itself with
other matters. Several of the sources I utilize for this paper bear titles that indicate a focus on
religiously inspired violence, themes that resound in the modern American mind. The need to
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find historical precedents for unrelated current events has, no doubt, brought to light a number
of texts and groups that would have otherwise remained obscured in history; unfortunately, the
medieval sources that have surfaced have become the victims of extremely skewed analyses and
struggle to appear as anything but examples of jihad for a modern audience to take out of
context.
Almohad Institutional Identity
Along similar developmental lines as the Almoravids, the Berber tribal confederation
that would eventually become the Almohad Caliphate started out in the Atlas Mountains of
North Africa. With the help of a religiously inspired charismatic leader, the Masmuda tribes
came together to form a political entity that would eventually overthrow the Almoravids and lay
claim to the Maghreb and alAndalus. However, just as the Almoravids are far too often
relegated to the position of a single part of the amorphous Muslim opponent of European
Christian forces during the time period marked by crusading ventures, so too are the Almohads
limited to the role of the great Muslim opponents during the height of the Spanish Reconquista.
Aside from these similarities in generalized backgrounds, destinies, and portrayals, the Almohad
Caliphate is a wholly different phenomenon than its predecessors. Whereas the Almoravids
grew from a loose confederation of allied and conquered Berber tribes bent on purifying Islam
throughout the region to a hereditary monarchy submitting itself under the nominal religious
authority of the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, the Almohads started as religious movement and
continued to think of themselves as the movement and keepers of the true faith at least up until
the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. Unlike the Almoravids, whose religious mission of
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purification could be altered significantly by the mere language of ibn Idhari, the religious aspect
of the Almohad movement, which is arguably the most defining feature of the group, could not
be ignored as easily.
Charismatic leadership without a doubt is a common trait between the Almoravids and
the Almohads. This generalized statement is where the similarity stops. While ibn Yasin
preached his particularly strict form of Islam under the authority and protection of those tribal
leaders who had originally believed his message, such as ibn Ibrahim and ibn Umar, the
Almohad movement began with one man: Muhammad ibn Tumart. Ibn Tumart was “the son of a
minor Berber chief from the Atlas Mountains south of Marrakech” who, following a pilgrimage
into the eastern heart of the Islamic world, returned to the Atlas Mountains with his mind set on
religious revival.69 Unlike ibn Yasin, he did not simply preach a mission to return to orthodoxy in
accordance with the religious authorities found in Baghdad; he decided instead to completely
shift the center of the Islamic world to the west, with himself as the mahdi, “the one who would
herald the end of time and the beginning of a new era in Islam” .70 This proclamation as mahdi
immediately places the movement in a far more religious light than that of the Almoravids, which,
considering the preaching mission of ibn Yasin and the early Almoravid movement, is a

69
70

Fromherz, The Almohads, 1.
Fromherz, The Almohads, 2. Fromherz elaborates on the term mahdi and its possible origins in his book;
simply put, the term and tradition itself have very little to no basis in Qur'anic and hadith sources. The term
mahdi is applicable in many situations, ranging from leaders of small scale urban reorganization to fabled
herald of the end times bringing sweeping changes to the world of Islam. This latter application is how
Fromherz understands the term mahdi in ibn Tumart's case; Fromherz argues this due to the eerily
coincidental sequence of events leading to ibn Tumart's being named mahdi by his followers to the
proclamation of Muhammad as prophet, which Fromherz discusses in detail. From this point forward it
should be assumed that any reference to the term mahdi as it applies to Muhammad b. Tumart is meant to
describe him as the one who would guide the Islamic community along the correct path in preparation for
the heralded end of days.
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considerable claim. By proclaiming himself mahdi, ibn Tumart asserted that he alone was to set
the Islamic community upon the right path, starting in the Maghreb. However, ibn Idhari does
not seem to have viewed ibn Tumart's claim as anything spectacular or unique in any sense. Of
ibn Tumart's proclamation, ibn Idhari says: ““El año 518 (1124) Muhammad b. Tumart se llamó
alMahdi”.71 Ibn Idhari says no more of ibn Tumart as the mahdi; this lack of interest is
peculiar, as he was obviously familiar with ibn Tumart's title. Whereas the lack of the term
guerra santa in ibn Idhari's sections concerning the early Almoravid campaigns against
Christians in the Iberian Peninsula could be explained by a disagreement in religious terminology
or possibly the actual lack of religious warfare, he does not seem to have an issue with ibn
Tumart's claim when taken at face value as a selfimposed title. His lack of discussion on the
topic could signify that he does not agree with the religious claim and does not see the topic as a
thing worth even gracing with discussion. However, the same silence on the matter could also
signify that he agrees with the religious claim or, as mentioned before, sees no issue with ibn
Tumart’s designation as mahdi in a historical sense, which is far more likely; this is backed up
further by ibn Idhari's continued use of the term mahdi throughout the rest of the text. If he had
truly disagreed with the religious implications of ibn Tumart’s use of the term mahdi, ibn Idhari,
one could assume, would have made a vehement effort to either provide the counterarguments
of some trusted theologian or would simply have refused to use the term in any other situation
referring to Muhammad b. Tumart from that point onwards. Perhaps, even though many
historians are inclined to disagree when it comes to any ancient or medieval source, ibn Idhari
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 158. “In the year 518 (1124), Muhammad b. Tumart was called mahdi”.
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was simply attempting to remain as objective as possible when dealing with such controversial
and charged historical figures and events. Alas, we are left to wonder about such choices of the
author with very little hope that such questions will be answered in the future with the current set
of sources available to historians.
As opposed to the Almoravid movement, which started in a Maghrebian context with
no central governing power and only a patchwork of tribal confederations, the Almohad
movement was born in world where the the Almoravid dynasty was at the height of its power as
it stretched from North Africa to alAndalus and waged wars throughout with those who were
considered heretics. Thus, ibn Tumart's Almohad movement had to deal with the political issues
of not only rallying local tribes to its cause but with assembling a confederation powerful enough
to topple over the reigning dynasty and all of its armies and resources. Ibn Tumart wasted no
time in using his message of tawhid, or belief in the absolute unity and oneness of Allah, as a
rallying point for his movement. It is from this term that the movement's name is based, the
Arabic being alMuwahhidun or  ﺍﻟﻤﻮﺣﺪﻭﻥ, meaning “the followers of the doctrine of divine
unity”.72 With this message of divine unity, he directed the conflict of orthodox Islam directly at
the Almoravids and their kingdom, whom he claimed had corrupted the faith with their jurists.
Ibn Idhari relates this pointed ideological assault on the Almoravids in the following passage: “Se
puso excitar a sus compañeros a luchar contra los velados – Almorávides – y les decía: 'matad
a los antropomorfistas y a los bereberes pervertidos y a los alfaquíes detestados”. 73 By calling
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for the death of the “veiled ones”, the Almoravids, and their jurists, ibn Tumart was calling into
question the religious and secular authority of the Almoravid dynasty.74
This outright hostility would eventually lead to open conflict with the Almoravids; as if in
anticipation of this, ibn Tumart had a series of fortress monasteries built that would constitute the
religious centers of his movement and of the empire it would become. Ibn Idhari dedicates a fair
amount of descriptive text to the first of these sanctuaries atop the mountain of Iyilliz:
Cuando se propagó su fama en las cabilas de las montañas y le llegaron a él, se fue con
ellos a la montaña del Iyilliz de Harga, y cuando se vio protegido por
montaña
la
y
defendido por sus seguidores, escribió a las cabilas y extendió su mano
para el
reconocimiento. Fue esto el año 516 (1122), según expondré en su lugar. Dice al'Yasa
b. Isa, el de Gafiq, que, cuando subió el imán a la montaña, mando fortificar su sitio,
porque no tenía más que un solo camino por el que no podíasino
ir un jinete tras otro,
por su mucha fragura.75
This rather lengthy description of ibn Tumart's sanctuary at the top of Iyilliz, which was
abandoned shortly thereafter for the mountaintop fortress of Tinmal, is indicative of ibn Tumart’s
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Fromherz, The Almohads, 812. While wearing veils was and continues to be a tradition of most Saharan
tribes, ibn Tumart made the wearing of the veil an insult pointed at Almoravid gender roles. Fromherz argues
that the traditional role of women within the tribal matriarchy was diminished as Islam permeated Almoravid
culture; however, a fair amount of tradition was left intact especially in regards to dress. Traditionally, men
that belonged to the Saharan Berber tribes wore veils and were often “identified … as the mulithamun (the
litham or mouthveil wearers). As the men wore veils and the women wore “their hair uncovered so high and
haughty it resembled Bactrian camel humps”, ibn Tumart found an easy target in his campaign against the
Almoravid backwardness and heresy.
Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 158. “When he [ibn Tumart] had propagated his fame amongst the tribes of
the mountains and they had come to him, he went with them to the mountain Iyilliz de Harga, and when he
was protected by the mountain and they defended it for their security, he wrote to the tribes and extended
his hand for recognition. This was the year 516 (1122) al'Yasa b. Isa of Gafiq said, that, when the imam rose
from the mountain, he commanded that they fortify the site because it had only a single path that but one
rider after another (single file) could go on as the road was this rough”.
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political situation. Surrounded by Almoravid enemies, the only logical location to foster his
movement was from the security of a ribat. The fortified position would not only protect his
people from the weapons of Almoravids attempting to put down heresy but also from the
spiritual influences of the Almoravids and their jurists. Thus, armed with an inspiring theological
movement and a sanctuary from which to preach his mission, ibn Tumart was free to begin the
process of accumulating enough tribes and power to openly challenge the Almoravid dynasty.
The most immediate difference between the two movements and their political identities
is the nature of their religious foundation. As previously mentioned, the Almohad concept of the
mahdi was completely divergent from the orthodox system set in place by the Almoravids.
However, scholars such as Fromherz believe that the development of the mahdi as the central
figure of the movement and the mahdi’s ability to rally a large number of tribes under a single
banner were natural extensions of the Berber tradition that was well established throughout the
Atlas Mountain region. According to Fromherz, “in a country where the rain is not always
faithful in its visits, where tribal discord can maintain a state of insecurity and economic crisis,
Morocco’s history has been shaped by those critical moments when charismatic chiefs emerge
with enough prestige to resonate through an entire dynasty. Maintaining power … required a
heavy and consistent application of spiritual charisma”; he argues that the terrain, political nature,
and “appeal to a miraculous situation” lent themselves to a history of “hagiocracy (the rule of
saints) and Mahdis”.76 Thus, ibn Tumart’s call to reform Islam from the ground up, backed up
by his extraordinary acts before arriving at Iyilliz that ibn Idhari simply leaves out in his text, and
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his proclamation as mahdi made him an ideal candidate to rally tribes either unsatisfied or
unallied with the Almoravids.77
Once more, of this ibn Idhari has little to say regarding ibn Tumart’s accumulation of
forces; what he does have to say is far from positive. Ibn Idhari paints the early rise of the
Almohad movement in a violent light:
Refiere esto ibn alQattan y me contó Abu Ali Salih que, cuando mató Muhammad b.
Tumart a los Hazmira de Tinmal, le dijo el alfaquí alIfriqui, uno de sus íntimos: “cómo
matas a gente que te ha reconocido y ha entrado en tu obediencia y repartes sus
bienes?”. Mandó matarlo y crucificarlo porque dudaba de su inviolabilidad. El matar a
los Hazmira de Tinmal fue el año 518 (1124). Reunió el Mahdi contra ellos a la gente
de aquella montaña, se levantó con ellos y mató quince mil personas. Cuando los
exterminó y saqueó sus bienes, edificó el castillo de Tinmal, y cuando se apoderó el
Mahdi de aquellas montañas y de sus dependencias, se hizo apretada la situación para
el emir Ali b. Yusuf y envió a ellas ejércitos, que fueron derrotados.78
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The brutal taking of the mountain where the future fortress of Tinmal would be built is aggressive
and straightforward. If anything, ibn Tumart’s violent reaction towards alIfriqi reveals a
character willing to kill those who question his authority on the spot. Simply put, this is a
negative view of the Almohad Caliphate. Even though ibn Idhari attributes the particular incident
to another author, he chose a rather damning view of the Almohads. While many Islamic
historians in the Maghreb, especially those of successor states like ibn Idhari’s Maranid
Dynasty, tend to focus on “portraying the legitimacy of movements and rebellions starting in
North Africa”, ibn Idhari seems to have attempted to legitimize his regime by denouncing the
other two.79 With the Almoravids, a use of vocabulary denouncing some of their earliest raids
against fellow Muslims was sufficient; with the Almohads, it seems ibn Idhari has avoided using
the storied beginning of the Almohads, the divine selection of the mahdi, and the holy mission of
rebuilding the Islamic world from the West. Instead, he opted to simply emit most of this and for
what scant history he does include about the rise of the Almohads, there is nothing holy about it.
This passage also provides, though I believe unintentionally, insight into the Almohad
institutional philosophy. Ibn Tumart’s reaction towards an individual who questioned his
authority is highly indicative of the overall focus on unity within the Almohad community. The
doctrine of tawhid, or unity and singularity of God, “meant not only the absolute unity of God,
but also the absolute unity of God’s community”.80 Following this train of thought, the death and
crucifixion of alIfriqi was a message communicating the unquestionable nature of the mahdi, and
therefore the religious element of the movement, and the absolute hierarchy within the early
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Almohad world. This lies in stark contrast to the beginning of the Almoravid movement, where
the religious element was merely tacked on to the preexisting tribal hierarchy and only
possessed power through the head tribe. The Almohad system rallied tribes around a single
religious and political leader, leading to greater solidarity than a strategic confederation of tribes.
Ibn Idhari, as opposed to how he relays the Almoravid rise to power, which he follows
with great detail, only jumps to key moments in the Almohad timeline. Following the
establishment of Tinmal but preceding the fall of the Almoravid dynasty, ibn Idhari only mentions
the Almohads in their military forays against the various Almoravid armies sent to subdue them.
He states at one point: “Este mismo año 524 (1129/30) bajó una taifa de las cabilas de los
Almohades a Kik y derrotaron a un ejército de Ali b. Yusuf y cogieron sus riquezas, armas y
tiendas; luego bajó con ellos Abd alMu'min a Agmat; la sitiaron y mataron en un día a cerca de
trescientos, la mayoría negros”.81 These victories indicate exactly how far the movement had
grown since its initial founding in the mountain ribat. Within five years, ibn Tumart had taken the
movement from the Atlas Mountains and was able to defeat the armies of the Almoravids in
battle. This trend continued as the Almohads defeated more and more Almoravid armies,
sowing discord among the various tribes residing within the mountains. Ibn Idhari records this in
the following: “Envió a ellos a su hermano Ibrahim, el conocido por ibn Tagyast, y se deshizo su
contingente sin lucha, cogiendo los Almohades sus tiendas, armas y banderas. Cuando corrió
esta desgracia y se divulgó esta derrota por el país de los Masmuda, aumentaron los que venían
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a ellos y surgió la revuelta fitna entre las cabilas de los Masmuda; el hombre mataba a su
padre en su casa, si se resistía a seguir al Mahdi …”.82 The military victories inspired further
dissension, building the Almohad numbers.
With increased numbers and military victories, the Almohads as a political unit grew
from a single tribe to a force able to vie with the Almoravids directly, pulling away tribes from
the Almoravid confederation one by one and gaining legitimacy on both political and religious
fronts. The discord this wrought on the loose alliances of the Almoravids is apparent as the
dynasty was toppled soon after. This trend also says much about both the inherent tensions
within Almoravid system of subjugating defeated tribes and the appeal of the Almohad’s
antiAlmoravid message. In 1130, ibn Tumart died, “his followers [keeping] his death secret for
three years for fear that the tribes would abandon their beloved Mahdi”; surprisingly, the
movement survived and began to thrive under the leadership of the dynasty’s new leader, Abd
alMu’min (11301163).83 In order to solidify the gains made under the tenure of ibn Tumart,
Abd alMu’min created political alliances via marriages. Ibn Idhari records such an instant
during the sack of Melilla: “salió ibn Zayu con el ejército y saqueó a Melilla y cogió en ella cien
doncellas y las repartió 'Abd alMu'min entre los Almohades; los favoreció Allah con ello.
Estaba entre ellas la hija de Maksan b. Mu’azz, señor de Melilla, y Fátima, hija de Yusuf; y
cogió Abd alMu’min a la hija de Maksan y Abu Ibrahim a Fátima y hicieron un banquete
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asmas”.84 The asmas was a Berber ritual banquet which tied families together and formalized
tribal and marriage alliances; in this way, Abd alMu’min legitimized Almohad power in the
traditional political and cultural manner, ensuring that the new tribes’ religious allegiance
extended well beyond belief and was backed up by blood and Berber tradition.85
In this way, the Almohads grew from ibn Tumart’s original following to a tribal
confederation that would eventually replace the Almoravid dynasty. The last of the Almoravid
kings with any power, Tasfin ibn Ali, was defeated and killed in 1145. Following this, the
Almohads pronounced themselves as the seat of a new Caliphate, separate from the Abbasids
in Baghdad. Ibn Idhari does not relay the exact moment or decision to utilize the title; he simply
and without much excitement states, “Envió la carta sobre la victoria al Califa 'Abd alMu'min
…”.86 This title begins to appear with frequency after the defeat of the “pretender” Muhammad
Abd Allah ibn Hud, who called himself alHadi/alMassi and raised an army of followers in
opposition of Abd alMu'min in 1147 immediately following the fall of Marrakesh and the
official end of the Almoravid dynasty. As opposed to their predecessors, who paid homage to
the Caliph in Baghdad, ibn Tumart’s vision came to fruition and placed the Almohads in a
position where they claimed to be the heart of the Islamic world and holders of the true faith.
With North Africa under their control, the Almohads could turn their attention to alAndalus,
which had returned to a system of taifas following the collapse of the Almoravids. Thus, the
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Almohads were poised to enter European history as the rampart of Islam in the face of
Christendom; this is the role that they would inherit in medieval Spanish history.
However, after reviewing the establishment and early history of the Almohads, even in
the scant and superficial manner outlined by ibn Idhari, one can gather that the Almohad
Caliphate was more nuanced than a simple band of jihadobsessed fanatics. Their political
identity was molded primarily by their unique mahdi movement and by their Berber origins. Ibn
Tumart and his successors crafted a distinct identity for the movement, one that stressed the
absolute unity of religion and of governance, Islamic purity and Berber traditions and loyalties.
As opposed to the Almoravids, who entered the historical scene in what could more or less be
described as a North African power vacuum, the Almohads entered history under the unified
rule of a ruling dynasty with wealth and power. Whereas the Almoravids utilized religion to
bolster the position of the leading tribe and coerced other tribes to join politically through
conquest, the Almohads used religion and a strict sense of unity in authority to showcase their
cause as the more just one; by positioning themselves as more divinely favored or simply more
powerful than the Almoravids, other tribes willingly submitted to the Almohads. If they did not,
conquest worked just as well. The Almohads, as authors like Fromherz are increasingly
demonstrating to a modern audience, are a novel blend of Islam and Berber tribalism that
deserves to be recognized as more than the enemies of Christendom during the height of the
Reconquista.
Almohad Ideological Identity
The Almohad Caliphate established its political identity around the concept of the
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mahdi. In doing so, the political identity and the ideology of the movement became one and the
same. Almohad ideology, like that of the Almoravids, was fundamentally based on the idea of
purity and orthodoxy of Islam presumably akin to the earliest Islamic community. However,
while the Almoravids were set on a strict adherence to this ideal form of Islam as interpreted
through the Malikite school of law, the Almohads defined orthodoxy in their own terms, placing
themselves in an ambiguous theological position that was not quite Sunni nor Shia. Their form of
Islam was one based on the absolute oneness of Allah, or tawhid ( ;)ﺗﻮﺣﻴﺪthis concept was
brought to the Islamic community by the mahdi, the rightly guided one who would restore Islam
to the correct path in preparation for the end of time. This tawhid as presented by the mahdi ibn
Tumart opened up the path for the Almohads to conduct religiously inspired war against their
immediate rivals, the Almoravids, and then any others who fell outside of their definition of
orthodoxy, which included the Christian kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula and rival Islamic
movements.
A quote referenced earlier provides an excellent example of the essence of the early
Almohad ideological position: “Se puso excitar a sus compañeros a luchar contra los velados –
Almorávides – y les decía: 'matad a los antropomorfistas y a los bereberes pervertidos y a los
alfaquíes detestados”. 87 The comment recorded by ibn Idhari, perhaps quite intentionally, is
succinct and aggressively pointed towards the Almoravid establishment. The velados came
under attack as antropomorfistas, or anthropomorphists. This attack is founded on the idea
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that the Almoravids, through their los bereberes pervertidos y a los alfaquíes detestados, had
perverted the pure nature of Allah by relying too heavily on their legal interpretations of the
Qur’an and, by doing so, took away from the mystery and unknowable character of Allah. In
essence, by lessening Allah’s divinity through texts of jurisprudence, they likened Allah to a
human. This was the most heinous of crimes in the minds of the Almohads. Their war with the
Almoravids, therefore, was justified as a necessary act to purify Islam. However, just as ibn
Idhari was seemingly highly selective about which Almoravid acts of violence counted as jihad
proper, it would seem that ibn Idhari does not deem the Almohad military campaigns against the
Almoravids as anything more than secular, political military operations devoid of any religious
justification. While he certainly attributes a religious motivation to the forays against the
Almoravids, he once more is hesitant to use the term guerra santa.
Again, as was done with the Almoravid sense of holy war, Reuven Firestone’s theories
concerning jihad founded primarily on Qur’anic verses and how ibn Idhari utilizes the term will
be the primary focus of this section. The majority of the time period covered by the author
concerns the Almohad struggles against fellow Muslims within North Africa as they solidified
their claim to power. There is evidence, as Firestone briefly argues, that indicates the historical
precedent for jihad to be waged against fellow Muslims. Chronologically speaking, this is
reasonable as “conflicts between Muslims”, including “wars fought against groups of apostates
rebelling against proper Islamic authority”, “highway robbers and other violent people”, and
“deviant or unIslamic leadership” are some of the first wars fought within the Arabian Peninsula
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before major expansion outward occurred in the mid to late seventh century.88 Thus, just as the
early Almoravids were justified in their religious wars against tribes whom they felt were
incorrectly practicing Islam, so too did the Almohads feel justified in combating their fellow
Muslims in North Africa a century later. Their storied part in the Reconquista opposite
crusading armies and the Spanish Military Orders would come in the thirteenth century, a
section of ibn Idhari's text that has unfortunately been lost to time. We can only speculate as to
the terminology that he utilized when discussing such a religiously charged subject.
In his initial conflicts against the Almoravids, ibn Tumart founded a headquarters from
which to launch both his preaching mission and attacks against his enemies. Once more, the
description of the first mountain fortress provides the appropriate evidence to analyze the
ideological position of the Almohad dynasty:
Cuando se propagó su fama en las cabilas de las montañas y le llegaron a él, se fue con
ellos a la montaña del Iyilliz de Harga, y cuando se vio protegido por
montaña
la
y
defendido por sus seguidores, escribió a las cabilas y extendió su mano
para el
reconocimiento. Fue esto el año 516 (1122), según expondré en su lugar. Dice al'Yasa
b. Isa, el de Gafiq, que, cuando subió el imán a la montaña, mando fortificar su sitio,
porque no tenía más que un solo camino por el que no podíasino
ir un jinete tras otro,
por su mucha fragura.89
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This fortified site from which to launch his preaching mission and campaign against the detested
veiled Almoravids bears a striking resemblance to a ribat, a fort “rather like a monastery for
traveling ascetics, mystics, pilgrims, or mujahidun”, thus giving the Almohads a site associated
with holy war to launch their jihad against their enemies.90 The establishment of the ribat can be
seen as a manifestation of religiously inspired violence, if not jihad, in stone; it is a striking
symbol of religious militancy akin to the crusader fortress in the Levant. With the Almohad
movement and their mahdi centered around a cluster of these fortresses in the mountains, they
made it abundantly clear that their purpose was war on behalf of Islam.
After gaining the upperhand in their war with the Almoravids, the Almohads under the
leadership of Abd Allah alMu'min ended the ruling dynasty after besieging the city of Orán in
1145. When Tasfin b. Ali fell to his death while attempting to escape from the Almohad siege,
his enemies searched for and eventually found his body. Ibn Idhari describes their actions upon
finding his body as such: “se buscó a Tasfin y fue encontrado muerto, se crucificó se cadáver y
se envió se cabeza a Tinmal”.91 Their treatment of the Almoravid king's body indicates their
belief that he was hardly deserving of a proper Islamic funeral but rather the death and morbid
display of a heretic. This trend is continued as the Almohads found themselves dealing with rival
tribes and religious movements that sought to displace the new dynasty, just as what had
happened with the Almoravids. One such movement was that of Muhammad Abd Allah b.
Hud, who called himself alHadi/alMassi and, as mentioned before, raised an army of followers
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in opposition to Abd alMu'min in 1147, the year in which the Almohads had finally seized
Marrakesh and killed the last of the Almoravid dynasty.92 This “pretender” and his movement
were promptly crushed by the military might of the Almohads; however, remnants of his army
and followers still existed and had to be dealt with. In a section of alBayan almugrib entitled
“Noticia de las marcha del jeque Abu Hafs alHintati desde la capital de Abd alMu’min para
combatir a los hipócritas y a las cabilas que se alzaron por la inovación de alMassi, el llamado
ibn Hud, después de vencerlo y matarlo”, ibn Idhari describes the action taken against them: “se
dirigió contra ellos y lo atacaron, resistiendo a la gente de 'Abd alMu'min y manteniéndose en
la obediencia del Massi …”.93 This violent and ruthless reaction towards a rival mahdi is
indicative of the willingness of the Almohad Caliphate to purge Islam of any innovations as they
perceived them, especially potential political and religious rivals. These could easily be justified
as jihad under the circumstances of purifying the religion from innovations and defending the
faith from false prophets. The campaign against their fellow Muslims, the Almoravids, could be
explained by the reasoning given by Firestone beforehand: jihad could be waged against those
who are false Islamic authorities leading the umma astray. Following the successful end to the
revolt, Abd alMu'min made a religious move that would solidify the Almohad dynasty’s
religious authority and political dominance in North Africa and eventually alAndalus: he
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proclaimed himself as “califa”.94 As discussed earlier, the term khalifa not only implied political
separation from the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad but also a religious independence from the
traditional leaders of the dar alIslam. This claim to religious authority and autonomy, in
essence, completely removed the Almohad Caliphate from the contemporary world of religious
hierarchy in Islam. This gave them unprecedented flexibility in determining and enforcing
orthodoxy as they saw fit.
Once more, as with the Almoravids, one must simply assume that ibn Idhari did not
agree with the particular definition of jihad that Firestone is using currently. As he does not use
the term guerra santa with both the Almoravid and Almohad campaigns against fellow Muslims
within North Africa but rather attributes it more or less only to campaigns against Christian
opponents in the Iberian Peninsula . For the Almohads, ibn Idhari marks this change with the
Almohad campaign against the Sicilian Christians in the city of alMahdiya in Ifriqiyya around
1159. He describes it in simple terms: “Cuando se completaron los ejércitos del resto del país
hacer la guerra santa, nombró su lugarteniente a Abu Hafs …”.95 The following siege of the city
and its conclusion are described in terms that recall to memory the sieges of Christian cities by
the Almoravids who waged war against Valencia earlier in the century. Ibn Idhari describes it as
such: “Duró el asedio de esta ciudad, defendida con fortificaciones elevadas, por espacio de
siete meses, hasta que Allah facilitó su conquista por capitulación de los cristianos, que pidieron
salir con el aman hacia su país. Les concedió lo que pedían y los sacó de ella, limpiando Allah
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con ello la región de Ifriqiya y el Zab, y se le concedió ante Allah un gran premio y
recompensa”. 96 The divine intervention and purifying acts of Allah are indicative of ibn Idhari’s
approval of this particular campaign.
Once more described as holy war, the fighting against the Sicilian Christians in
alMahdiya is distinct from earlier campaigns in only two respects: location and the nature of the
enemy. As opposed to fighting in lands that were technically under the control of an Islamic
dynasty, one many would call orthodox, the Almohads were now fighting in lands lost to
Christian conquests following the onset of the First Crusade. This, as one can imagine, could be
viewed in a holy light by most Islamic historians such as ibn Idhari; the recapture of lands that
had long been under Muslim control which had then been lost to Crusading Norman forces
surely resonated with a wider community of the Islamic faith. Thus, by the very nature of the
location of the conflict, it was far easier to apply religious connotations to the enemy fought:
Norman Christians. As opposed to the gray area of combating and purifying Muslims, the
ideology of fighting Christians, especially those directly associated with the conquest of what
would have been considered a portion of the dar alIslam, was a far clearer and more widely
supported view.
However, the same event can be examined from a purely political point of view as well.
After having purified their own domain of heretics and dissident groups, a war waged against a
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less controversial enemy may have been less religiously inspired and more an act of political
positioning and the consolidation of power; one can see a paralleled strategy in Christian Europe
and the call for crusade against an enemy that was far from home and would require local
powers to make peace with each other. Surely the aforementioned purges would have been less
than popular politically speaking and the replacement of one ideologically driven ruling party for
another was no doubt grating to those tribes that had so unwillingly joined the Almoravids.
Though the Almoravids had indeed grown weak enough to be defeated by an upstart group
with superior organizational and political structure, it was the nature of their rise to power that
could have made the Almohads equally unpopular amongst some groups. The early cited
incident of ibn Tumart killing the alfaqih alIfriqi provides an excellent example of how extreme
this ideology of solidarity could be: “cuando mató Muhammad b. Tumart a los Hazmira de
Tinmal, le dijo el alfaquí alIfriqui, uno de sus íntimos: ‘cómo matas a gente que te ha
reconocido y ha entrado en tu obediencia y repartes sus bienes?’. Mandó matarlo y crucificarlo
porque dudaba de su inviolabilidad.”97 Thus, one can reasonably assume that the strike against
Sicilian Christians was not only conducted out of a religious zeal to wage jihad but also to move
war and conflict against a more common ideological enemy at the edges of the Almohad
domain. In this sense, the campaign becomes an instance of solidifying power within Almohad
borders by focusing conflicts externally; all of this is assumed without taking into consideration
the strategic importance of Ifriqiyya and all of the ports to be found in what is modern day
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Tunisia, which could have very easily provided further incentive to look outward after years of
internal strife.
Following this foray with Christian forces in alMahdiya, ibn Idhari records a series of
conflicts that the Almohads undertook against Muslim enemies who engaged with Christians as
allies. The first instance of this as recorded by ibn Idhari also marks the return to alAndalus by
the Almohads following their initial campaigns into the peninsula in during which they wrested
lands away from the last of the Almoravid holdouts.
El año 554 (1159) salió Muhammad b. Mardñis de la ciudad de Murcia con su ejército
y sus compañeros los cristianos y con su grupo perverso, aprovechando la ocasión,
según el creía, e imaginando lo que le perturbó el vino en su mente, que en la ausencia
del Amir alMu’minin, vencería a los Almohades hasta que sitió la ciudad de Jaén, en la
que estaba Muhammad b. Ali alKumi, quien le acompaño en violar el reconocimiento,
accediendo a sus deseos y lo apresuró su infortunio en su idea de apostatar.98
The depiction of ibn Mardñis and alKumi as apostates and deviants who gave in to their
desires, were corrupted by wine, and did not recognise Almohad religious authority was only
worsened in ibn Idhari’s eyes by the fact that they openly associated with Christians and their
grupo perverso. The only association between ibn Mardñis and alKumi that seems to have
mattered to both ibn Idhari and the Almohads is that they were both taifa princes outside of the
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sovereignty of the Almohad Caliphate. Once more, there is plenty of data as provided by ibn
Idhari to support both religious and political motives behind waging war in alAndalus. The
ideological components to this are simple enough to understand: by refusing to acknowledge
Almohad religious authority, ibn Mardñis and alKumi both placed themselves in the position of
heretics. Their heretical behavior led to an association with Christians on such a level that ibn
Idhari sees fit to assume that they had not only refused the debatable authority of the Almohad
Caliphate but had altogether abandoned Islam and apostatized. Politically speaking, Almohad
campaigns against enemies in alAndalus only strengthened their own position and extended
their borders further into Iberia.
Ibn Idhari records a similar disposition towards another taifa prince, Ibrahim ibn
Hamusk of Murcia. He relays the following concerning the many who died fighting against the
traición de ibn Hamusk: “Sufrieron el martirio ese día muchos Almohades y Andaluces, y fue
una gran desgracia y un infortunio grave. Allah mantuvo a los Almohades sitiados en la alcazaba
sitiada, a pesar de ver la desgracia ante sus ojos, pues contemplaban desde lo alto de la
alcazaba la muerte de sus hermanos. Se retiró ibn Hamusk de este combate con sus
compañeros, los cristianos, a la alcazaba roja en Granada, y mataba a los prisoneros almohades
que estaban en sus mano y los atormentaba a la vista de sus hermanos”.99 Ibn Idhari describes
the plight of the Almohad forces dying in their struggle with the apostate ibn Hamusk. Just as
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before, this conflict with a Muslim who is accompanied or allied with Christians appears to be a
more comfortable topic for ibn Idhari; here he has no difficulty recalling how Allah maintained
the besiegers and provided the opportunity for many of them to become martyrs before the very
eyes of their brothers.
However, there is the almost out of place mention of the disgrace and misfortune in ibn
Idhari’s recollection of the siege. This is one more instance of ibn Idhari’s character as an author
and historian separating itself from the typical North African historian. He was, as one can very
easily see from the data provided thus far, not opposed to the use of common tropes within
Islamic historiography: his use of formulaic curses and praises of key figures in his histories, his
focus on battles, jihad, and other religiously motivated conflicts, and his attribution of Allah’s
divine will in most temporal events serve to demonstrate this point.100 Then again, his curses and
praises are highly selective, as are his selections of battles; his use and very specific criteria for
the term jihad has already been discussed several times in this overview. While he has a place
for Allah’s will in events, ibn Idhari seems to attribute more to the politics and nature of man in
the playing out of events. One can imagine that ibn Idhari, though outwardly praising the
opportunity to wage war on behalf of Islam, seems to have disapproved of Muslims slaughtering
each other, whether they be Berbers or Andalusian.
The final two examples to be examined take place under the reign of Abd alMu’min’s
successor and son, Abu Ya'qub Yusuf I (1163–1184). He is the last of the Almohad Caliphs
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Throughout alBayan almugrib, ibn Idhari dedicates several chapters to the praise of key figures like
Yusuf b. Tasfin and his son Ali b. Yusuf. He also regularly utilizes the phrase “Dios lo maldiga”, which is a
typical curse (God damn them!) seen in crusade chronicles.
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that the extent version of ibn Idhari’s text covers and the following excerpts constitute some of
the final examples of the use of the term jihad/guerra santa/ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺩwithin the text. The first of
this pair occurs four years into Abu Ya’qub’s reign: “Este año (563) [1167] llamó a los Arabes
y les escribió una carta y una qasida en la que los excita a la guerra santa, y los llama a la
expedición y a prepararse … Este año se sublevaron los bereberes hipócritas en la montaña de
Tasrirt”.101 This call to guerra santa is accompanied by a qasida, a traditional Arabic poem,
calling the “Arabs” to rise up and fight the Berbers who had revolted in the mountains.102 Just as
before, this call can easily be seen for both religious and political gains, the former being a call to
purge heretical tribal elements from the mountains and the latter being a call to mobilize a military
force to quell disruptive political dissent. The reference to the “Arabs” could be a possible
attempt to frame the Almohad community as reflections of the original followers of Muhammad
in the early days of Islam. This trend is reflected again in Abu Ya’qub’s call for a guerra santa
against the maldito tirano Giraldo, el gallego, which ibn Idhari describes as such: “... el Amir
alMu’minin tendió su mirada al Oeste del Andalus para ayudarla y defenderla y dirigió su
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 399. “This year (563) [Abu Ya’qub] called the Arabs and wrote them a
letter and a qasida, exciting them to holy war, and calling them to the expedition and to prepare themselves
… This year the hypocritical Berbers revolted in the mountain of Tasrirt”.
102
“Kasida.” In Encyclopedia of Islam,
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaediaofislam2/kasidaCOM_0461. “Ḳaṣīda
collective ḳaṣīd is the name given in Arabic to some poems of a certain length.The ḳaṣīda, which numbers
at least seven verses, but which generally comprises far more, consists essentially of three parts of variable
length: (1) a prologue in which the poet sheds some tears over what was once the camping place of his
beloved now far off ( bukāʾ ʿalā ’laṭlāl ), then describes the charms of the latter, which he forebears to
pursue (the nasīb [see g̲
h̲
azal ]). (2) The poet’s narration of his journey ( raḥīl ) to the person to whom the
poem is addressed. This part of the ḳaṣīda is a pretext for descriptions of the desert and the hero’s mount,
as well as for lyrical flights of eloquence, for example on the insignificance of man. (3) As a general rule, this
raḥīl leads without any great transition into the central theme, constituted by the panegyric of a tribe, a
protector or a patron, or in satire of their enemies.
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acción al propósito de hacer la guerra santa y compadecerse de los musulmanes y defender la
religión, cuando vio que el enemigo abrió contra ella la boca y corrieron las lágrimas de su gente
en sangre”.103 Again, the language indicates dual purposes of waging what ibn Idhari considers
jihad. References to people’s blood and the need to defend the religion against enemies like
Giraldo the Galician fall under the criteria of defensive jihad when utilizing Firestone’s definition.
The enemy, a Christian lord who was seen as a tyrant over Muslims, was easy to position in a
way that put the Almohads in the religious right. Just as the other calls, this one too could easily
be manipulated for political gain in the Iberian Peninsula. The salvation of Muslims under
Christian tyranny acted as the reasoning for expansion into the peninsula, which had obvious
political and expansionist goals in mind, namely a strengthening of the frontier zone between the
Christian kingdoms to the north and alAndalus in the south.
In the end, the data drawn from ibn Idhari’s records of the Almohads indicates, just as
with the Almoravids, a far more nuanced approach to holy war than is usually attributed to
them. While we will never know what exactly the Almohads believed they were doing, we can
craft a far more complex notion of their ideology and approach to jihad by examining the
examples and language ibn Idhari chose to use in his history.
The Berber Dynasties and Their Place in the Crusade Mosaic
By the time the Almohads had been routed at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212, the identity
of the Almohads had been set. The crusading mentality of the period, especially in the Christian
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Ibn Idhari, alBayan almugrib, 405. “The accursed tyrant Giraldo the Galician”; “The Commander of the
Believers held his gaze to the west of Andalus with the purpose of helping and defending it and directed his
action to the purpose of jihad, to sympathize with the Muslims, to defend the religion when he saw the
enemy open its mouth against them and the tears of the people ran in blood”.
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kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula following the Reconquista, had placed the Almoravids and
the Almohads in the role of the Muslim enemy. As the crusade mentality ran rampant throughout
the Levant, the opportunity to capitalize on recently converted Berber Muslims invading the
Iberian Peninsula and waging wars against the Christian kingdoms could not be missed.
Unfortunately, the efforts to frame both dynasties as the opponents of Christendom through the
writing of history, stories, and song have been far too successful, leaving the dynasties virtually
unknown to European audiences until recent scholarship was published and brought them back
to light.
Ibn Idhari’s work provides one more opportunity to study these two groups, and what
he has to say is enlightening. His focus on the early political and military campaigns of the
dynasties and his selective and fairly unique definition of jihad provides a perspective on the
Almoravids and Almohads that can help add complexity to their identities. Using ibn Idhari’s
work, we can make several conclusions regarding the Almoravid and Almohad movements.
First, though placed in the same geographical constraints as each other, each group rose to
political power through subtly different methods. Second, both dynasties, at least according to
ibn Idhari, approached the concept of holy war in vastly different ways.
Regarding their political rises to power, there are some similarities. Both were inherently
conquestoriented, relying heavily on military prowess to defeat political rivals and conquest to
place themselves in the highest positions of power in the North African region surrounding the
Atlas Mountains. Both utilized Islam as rallying point in their causes, though the exact manners in
which they used the religion differed. The Almoravids utilized religion to justify their campaigns
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over fellow Berber tribes, convinced that they were purifying Islam of corruption in the process.
The Almohads on the other hand utilized the mahdi movement to not only justify the cleansing of
the umma and Islam as a whole of impurities, such as the Almoravids, but also to create unity in
leadership, both religious and political.
This leads to the next major point regarding the political structures of the two dynasties.
Both were able to expand from tribal movements to continentspanning kingdoms. It can be
assumed that both movements had impressive administrative systems with which to manage this
sprawling span of land mass, though ibn Idhari primarily showcases the Almoravid
administrative system with data, albeit cursory data at best. Along this same train of thought, it
can be assumed that both the Almoravids and the Almohads had effective systems of
leadership, though ibn Idhari’s record indicates some notable differences. The Almoravids,
without a doubt, had a strong sense of leadership within their movement centered around the
amir alMuslimin; however, this leadership seems to have broken down by the time of Ali b.
Yusuf, as he not only had to deal with the rebellion of the Almohads, but his descendants
quarreled with each other and were deposed by the up and coming Almohads. The Almohads,
as mentioned before, were able to utilize the position of the mahdi as a religious and political
figure of solidarity and unity so well that, following his death, the movement did not fall apart and
instead simply continued under the leadership of a succession of Caliphs.
The notion of holy war and jihad is one that both dynasties seemingly approached with
different mindsets. Of course, this discussion must always be prefaced by the fact that it is ibn
Idhari’s words we are reading, not ibn Yasin or ibn Tumart’s; however, this provides an
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particularly unique angle from which to examine the question. As discussed previously, ibn
Idhari did not use the term ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺩ/guerra santa/jihad liberally. On the contrary, based on the
instances given to us by ibn Idhari we can assume several things. First, war against Christians
outside of the Iberian Peninsula (such as Normans) could be considered jihad. This extended,
with some notable exceptions, to Christians and Muslims allied to Christians within Iberia; the
aforementioned notable exceptions include the campaigns of Yusuf b. Tasfin against Valencia
and Rodrigo Díaz, the Cid. This is unusual to say the least, as it is this instance in history in
particular that has shaped modern notions of the Almoravids as the jihadcrazed invaders who
El Cid valiantly beat back as the savior of Christian Spain on the brink of Reconquista. Yet,
while there is a plethora of language that could easily justify the campaigns as religiously inspired
wars or, at least, wars with a heavy emphasis on religious ideology, ibn Idhari simply does not
deem it necessary to use the term jihad. Second, war against other Muslims was not deemed
jihad except in rare cases. The early Almoravid raids against their fellow Berber Muslim tribes,
again while described with jihad rhetoric, are not labeled as jihad proper by ibn Idhari. This
extends to the Almohad battles against the Almoravids as well; while it was certainly well
reported that the Almohads believed they were purifying Islam by fighting the Almoravids, ibn
Idhari once more refuses to use the term while describing their exploits. Aside from some minor
cases of rebelling Berbers in the mountains and traitorous Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula, we
can assume that ibn Idhari did not see war against Muslims, no matter how religiously justified,
as jihad.
Moving away from how the author depicts jihad as a whole, we can observe that, while
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both groups definitely participated in some sort of religious warfare, the context in which they
entered the conflict varied between the groups. The Almoravids, for example, waged religious
war against any of those who did not follow Islam in the strict form they perceived to be
orthodox. The term jihad was only used when waging war against the Christian kingdoms in
northern Spain; in a sense, they only waged jihad when Islam was actually perceived to be
under attack. Perhaps the taifa kings and their open affiliation with Christians prevented the
Almoravid response to their plight to be labeled as jihad, as the faith itself was not under siege.
The Almohads, on the other hand, while waging religious wars against the Almoravids, saw the
majority of their campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula as jihad, as these were directed against
Christians and traitorous Muslims. Unlike the Almoravids and by virtue of their adherence to
tawhid, the Almohads practically viewed all of Islam as under attack, both by enemies from
within and without. This extended the realm of jihad to include fellow Muslims. This could help
explain their seemingly broader definition of the term. No matter what the reasons, ibn Idhari’s
peculiarly specific usage of the term jihad certainly provides perhaps not a clearer but a far
more complicated, sometimes dizzyingly confusing, and almost random understanding and
utilization of jihad that should be examined further.
Altogether, it must be said that ibn Idhari and alBayan almugrib do not simplify or
clarify the identities of these two often overlooked dynasties. However, his text and opinions
regarding the history of the Almoravids and Almohads without a doubt provide a far more
nuanced, complicated, and possibly more realistic view of the two. By shedding some light on
this, it is my hope that the Almoravids and Almohads will be able to break free from the
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amorphous label “enemy of Islam” that has for so many centuries been on the opposing side of
the crusade mosaic and find a more comfortable and more accurate place in the mosaic as two
more parties involved in what is by far one of the most misunderstood eras of history.
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